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Memory enclaves with software configuration information
ABSTRACT
Software guard extensions (SGX) allow an application to instantiate within memory a
protected container, referred to as an enclave. An enclave is an area in the address space of an
application that provides confidentiality and integrity even in presence of software of higher
privilege, even if such software is malicious. The protection is achieved by restricting nonenclave accesses to code/data resident in the enclave, and by enforcing execution integrity for
the enclave. An enclave has an identity, which comprises, for example, a hash of the code
resident in the enclave, hash of a key with which the enclave was signed, a product version
number and product category assigned by the software vendor, a hardware configuration of the
enclave, etc. Within SGX, there are hardware-based mechanisms to attest to the identity of an
enclave. There are also mechanisms to derive, using software and hardware, keys tied to a
portion of the identity of the enclave. However, at present, there is no provision for enclave
software to record the identity of its own configuration, or to seal secrets based on such
recorded values. This disclosure describes mechanisms that allow enclave software to record
and seal its configuration identity.
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BACKGROUND
Cloud computing services enable a customer to provide software code to be executed on
a computer provided by the cloud computing service provider. A customer may need to verify
that such code and customer data is kept off-limits, e.g., from other customers that use the cloud
computing service, the cloud computing service provider itself, etc. aside from access as
explicitly authorized by the customer.

Fig. 1: An enclave within an address space of an application loaded by a customer on a remote
server

Secure remote computing is the problem of executing software on a remote computer,
e.g., a computer that is owned and operated by an untrusted party. Fig. 1 illustrates an example
of secure remote computing. A customer connects using a client computer (102) to a remote
computer (104) via a network (106) and uploads data and code to the remote computer. The
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remote computer may be untrusted, and the customer may want to verify that the uploaded data
and code are secure, and used only in accordance with explicit authorization. Software guard
extensions (SGX) solve this problem of secure remote computing by leveraging trusted
hardware in the remote computer. The trusted hardware may comprise a processor (108) and
memory (110). Within memory of the remote computer is established a secure container,
known as an enclave (112). A customer of the remote computation service uploads code and
data into the secure container. The trusted hardware protects the confidentiality and integrity of
such code and data during computation.
An enclave is a restricted access execution environment. Access to an enclave's memory
is restricted to software resident within the enclave and is prevented to software not resident in
the enclave. Even software running at higher privilege levels, including malware, is not
permitted access to the enclave. The enclave remains protected and provides confidentiality and
integrity guarantees, even when, for example, the BIOS, Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) or
hypervisor, Operating System (OS) or kernel, drivers, etc. are compromised. Even adversaries
that possess full execution control over the remote computer are prevented from accessing code
and data that are in the enclave, or tampering with execution of the enclave.
An enclave validates its integrity by using hardware-based mechanisms to respond to
attestation challenges. Attestation proves to remote software that it is communicating with a
specific piece of software running in a secure container hosted by trusted hardware. The proof
is a cryptographic signature that verifies the identity of the contents of the secure container,
which may comprise hash of the contents of the secure container, or a signature over the
contents of the container, or some combination thereof. When the identity of the contents of an
enclave, provided in response to a challenge, does not match an expected response, a customer
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of the remote-computation service can elect, for example, to not load further data or code into
the enclave, or take other actions. Conversely, verification of the identity provides a high
degree of certitude that the enclave is trustworthy.
For example, a customer that utilizes a cloud service for data analysis operations may
desire to ensure that access to the execution code as well as data be restricted from other
customers and the cloud service provider itself. Further, customers that utilize cloud services
may also verify that a correct version (e.g., a verified untampered version) of execution code
was applied in the processing of the data, e.g., to guarantee that output of the data analysis is
reliable.
An enclave is managed via a collection of data structures. For example, the identity of
an enclave is defined within a data structure known as the SGX Enclave Control Structure
(SECS). The SECS has several fields that keep a track of the identity, e.g., a MISCSELECT
field, an ATTRIBUTES field, an MRENCLAVE field, an MRSIGNER field, an ISVPRODID
field, an ISVSVN field, etc. However, at present, fields that pertain to the identity do not record
the configuration of the software running inside an enclave. Such fields are also not usable to
provision or seal secrets based on the recorded value. Lack of such fields precludes a customer
from launching an enclave written/signed by one vendor, and customizing that enclave to their
own needs based on security-sensitive configuration information (e.g., public key of the
customer's smart card).
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DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques that enable recording of software configuration
within the enclave identity, thereby making software configuration part of the enclave identity.
For example, two fields are introduced that pertain to software configuration. The two fields
may be inserted in a data structure that manages the enclave, e.g., the SECS data structure.
The first of the two fields is referred to as SWCFGNONMONOTONIC, which may, for
example, span 256 bits. Any entity that requires checking of software configuration can
perform a comparison with SWCFGNONMONOTONIC to verify an exact match with
expectation. For example, software executing on a customer’s on premise computers, or
software executing in other enclaves (e.g., on a computer of the remote-computation service
provider) can perform such verification.
The second of the two fields is referred to as SWCFGMONOTONIC, which may, for
example, be 32 bits wide. The field SWCFGMONOTONIC is greater than or equal to the
expected value. Any entity that requires checking of software configuration can perform a
comparison with SWCFGMONOTONIC to verify that SWCFGMONOTONIC is greater than
or equal to an expected value.
Access to the above two fields may be enabled by extending the instruction set of a
processor that provides the enclave to enable software code write to these two fields in a writeonce fashion. The write-once semantics of these fields ensure that subsequent attempts to write
to these fields cause a failure, either by way of error or exception. For example, when software
is initially loaded to an enclave, a configuration is provided as an input to the enclave. The
fields as described herein are programmed (e.g., assigned values) based on the configuration
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prior to the software execution. Since the fields are write once, a bad software configuration is
not able to rewrite the fields in the enclave, e.g., with incorrect values. For example, if such
software attempts to load a dynamic library to the enclave, e.g., a library that attempts to change
values of the fields, rewriting the fields to hide the fact that a bad library was loaded is
prevented.
Within the SGX instructions, there is a leaf function ENCLU[EREPORT]. Leaf
functions are those that don’t call other functions. The leaf function ENCLU[EREPORT] can
only be executed inside an enclave and creates a cryptographic report of the enclave. Per
techniques of this disclosure, the ENCLU[EREPORT] leaf function is extended to include in
the hardware-generated report contents of the fields SWCFGMONOTONIC and
SWCFGNONMONOTONIC.
Within the SGX instructions, there is also a leaf function ENCLU[EGETKEY], which
returns a secret key from the processor-specific key hierarchy. ENCLU[EGETKEY] derives
keys using a value unique to a processor in order to create a specific key. ENCLU[EGETKEY]
can only be executed inside an enclave. An input to the ENCLU[EGETKEY] function is a data
structure known as KEYREQUEST, which is used to select from one of the processor-specific
keys, and set additional parameters required in the derivation of the selected key. Within the
KEYREQUEST data structure is another data structure known as KEYPOLICY. Fig. 2
illustrates the data structures KEYREQUEST and KEYPOLICY.

http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/383

7

Savagaonkar: Memory enclaves with software configuration information

Fig. 2: Fields of the KEYREQUEST and KEYPOLICY data structures, and their mutual
relationship (from [1])

Per techniques of this disclosure, the KEYREQUEST data structure is extended to add a
SWCFGMONOTONIC field, which may be, for example, 32 bits wide. Further, per techniques
disclosed herein, the KEYPOLICY data structure is extended to add a SWCFG bit. An example
illustration of the resulting KEYREQUEST and KEYPOLICY data structures is shown in Fig.
3.
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Fig. 3: An example modification of the KEYREQUEST and KEYPOLICY data structures, per
techniques of this disclosure.

Once input to the ENCLU[EGETKEY] function is modified, for example, as shown in Fig.
3, the behavior of the ENCLU[EGETKEY] leaf function is defined in accordance with the
following rules:
1. If the KEYPOLICY→SWCFG bit is set, then two enclaves with different values of
SECS→SWCFGNONMONOTONIC get cryptographically independent keys,
irrespective of other portions of identities of the two enclaves. That is, if the
KEYPOLICY→SWCFG bit is set, then the key returned by the ENCLU[EGETKEY]
leaf function is bound to the software configuration portion of the enclave identity.
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2. Two ENCLU[EGETKEY] invocations, either from the same enclave or from different
enclaves, with two different values of KEYREQUEST→SWCFGMONOTONIC result
in cryptographically independent keys, irrespective of the other portions of the identity.
3. An ENCLU[EGETKEY] invocation succeeds if and only if the
KEYREQUEST→SWCFGMONOTONIC has a value that is less than or equal to that
of SECS→SWCFGMONOTONIC.
These extensions are similar to the functionality of the ENCLU[EGETKEY] leaf with regard to
MRSIGNER, ISVPRODID, ISVSVN, etc. portions of enclave identity. Similar extensions are
made to enclaves that attest to the identity of another enclave.
Modifications to the SGX instruction set, as described above, enable software running
inside an enclave to record the identity of its configuration, that is not otherwise captured by
existing enclave identity semantics. Further, per techniques described herein, secrets may be
sealed and/or provisioned based on the recorded value.
Per this disclosure, the hardware does not assign any specific meaning to the value of
SWCFGNONMONOTONIC. It is completely up to the enclave software and the remote
customer software to assign a meaning to SWCFGNONMONOTONIC. Also, the hardware is
configured only for the monotonic nature of the SWCFGMONOTONIC field to be valid. The
hardware configuration does not assign any specific meaning to SWCFGMONOTONIC, other
than for the monotonic relationship between the two fields to be valid.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to record the configuration or identity of software
running within an enclave, which is a secure container within the memory of a computer. For
example, two fields are added to a data structure that manages the enclave. The first of the two
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fields serves to verify an exact match of software configuration with expectation. The second of
the two fields serves to verify that the field is greater than or equal to expectation.
Modifications in the data structure and leaf functions are proposed to support the functionalities
described herein. Per techniques of this disclosure, software executing inside an enclave can
record the identity of its configuration, and provision/seal secrets based on the recorded value.
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